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Abstract
In the II postwar phase of intensive growth, Italian policy makers,
controlling banking system, used credit deepening as the leading in-
strument for policy targets: the industrialization of the country and
reduction of regional disparities. This work presents a reconstruction
of territorial long run loans to the manufacturing industries, outlining
some aspects of the Italian development path summarized by a strat-
egy of industrialization which was different across areas and branches.
Moreover, it suggests a positive effect of credit deepening on product
per worker in a cross section time series analysis, looking at eleven
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the Centre-North and the Mezzogiorno.
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1 Introduction
The European post war experience of sustained growth was founded on the
mix of favourable institutions and policy activism (Boltho 1989). The ac-
tivism slowly declined during the 1970s until the first half of the 1990s. After
the Maastricht Treaty, the national industrial policies in Europe are actu-
ally shrunk by a supranational control. This has meant a loss of sovereignty
to implement any strategy of industrialization fitting to the national objec-
tives of policy makers. The new view of industrial policy reflects the main
purposes of economic and social cohesion within the European Union and
the defense of free competition among firms in the European unified market.
The new objectives allow new principal of industrial policy as well as new
instruments. The intervention measures were coherently adjusted to have an
impact on the whole context rather than on the single firm or industry.
But the most recent economic events -from faster globalization to the down-
ward turning of the Western economy and the deterioration of the world’s
financial system- have sharply refocused the attention on sector-based issues
returning to the earlier decision making policies approach in which the state
intervention plays an active part, nevertheless this happens in a climate of
cooperation.
From a historical perspective industrial policy was largely used by sovereign
states after World War I and its principles were essentially different from the
present. Federico and Foreman-Peck (1999) defined industrial policy as “ev-
ery form of state intervention that affects industry as a distinct part of the
economy”. This general definition embraces of course the Italian experience
after 1945. The aim of Italian policy makers was to reduce the unemployment
rate by industrializing all areas of the country. In the North the productive
capacity lost in the war was recovered and empowered; whilst in the south
the relative lack of a wide industrialization required a great effort in terms
of resources and funding in order to build up a modern industrial structure.
Furthermore, industry was considered the royal road to reduce regional dis-
parities. More generally speaking, the phase of intensive growth (1945-1971)
required extra-market mechanisms in Europe and a bank-based financial sys-
tem to raise funds for industrialization (Eichengreen 2007). Italian policies
did not differ from the rest of Europe in terms of aims but surely in terms of
instruments. This paper goes back to the 1950s and 1960s exploring an inten-
sive phase of state intervention in manufacturing industries focusing on long
run credit as a growth device. At a first glance, (the) industrial policy in Italy
during the golden age experienced two stages: the 1950s in which the leading
instruments were the state-owned enterprises and holdings and the 1960s in
which the major channel of growth for the manufacturing industry was the
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credit system. In southern Italy the first phase was actually negligible, as
the investments of the major state-owned enterprises were gathered in the
North. The main goal of state intervention was to create the pre-requisites
for industrialization in the South, according to Rosenstein-Rodan’s (1949)
view of industrialization and the public effort went towards the existing firms
preventing change in the production structure which could be able to offer
the possibility of rapid growth (Chenery 1962). On the contrary, the 1960s
are devoted to boosting national industrial structure in the whole country
by credit deepening. As Nardozzi (2004) maintained, the financial way to
industrialization depicted the political economy in those years. From this
respect, the study of the double goal of Italian industrial policy, boosting
industrialization and reducing regional disparities, requires a sector-based
and territorial analysis. The relationship between credit and growth, in a
broad sense, was analyzed with reference to Italy’s post-unification period
by the remarkable works of Gerchenkron(1955, 1962), Cameron (1972) and
Cohen (1967). For the post World War II, several contributions, limited
to national debate, explored the credit-growth relationship for the period
1960-1980 covering Italy as a whole (Pontollillo 1971, 1980 and Ranci 1983).
More robust were the contributions to the analysis of subsidized loans broken
by region or sectors, but not by both dimensions (Marzano 1979, Pergolesi
1988, Del Monte and Giannola 1997). Other recent contributions focused
on the spatial distribution of subsidized loans and grants to the territories
of the “Intervento straordinario”(i.e. Spadavecchia 2007). Anyway, what is
lacking is a sector perspective and what is neglected is a broad view that
includes subsidized loans and market rate loans. A complete inquiry has to
also take account for the market loans, since, as it is well recognized, the
“Intervento straordinario”was subsidiary of and not supplementary to ordi-
nary state intervention. On the other hand, an analysis of the long run loans
to the manufacturing industry by sectors and areas were prevented by the
lack of such a data at regional or macro-regional level. Official publication
of the Bank of Italy, the Bollettino, reports the annual partition by man-
ufacturing branches of the stock of loans for entire Italy. The same source
displays regional data on loans for the whole manufacturing industry without
a partition by branches. However the economic characteristics of the Ital-
ian economy, namely territorial disparities and late comer status, require at
least a macro-regional analysis of the intensive growth phase. The intention
of this paper is to discuss whether the industrialization strategy of that time
followed any criteria and what the impact was of long run credit on the devel-
opment of industrial branches during the golden age. I have tried to address
some reflections on these issues that belong to the class of arguments that
Crafts and Toniolo (1996) suggested to consider as a part of the explanation
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of the European postwar growth experience.
The first part of this paper provides a reconstruction of the annual stock of
loans distributed to the manufacturing industry broken by eleven branches
for two macro-regions, the Centre-North and the Mezzogiorno. Starting from
the accounting identity of bank balances I merge official data from the Bank
of Italy and data drawn from selected publications of the Board of the Min-
istries for the Mezzogiorno in order to obtain the desired partitions. Fur-
thermore, an evaluation of the financing strategy is provided based on the
non parametric analysis of distributed loans. In the second part, I test the
impact of credit deepening in a time series cross section framework. Both
qualitative and quantitative analyses of this class of industrial policy outline
some aspects of the italian development path summarized by a strategy of
industrialization diversified by area and branch, and by a positive effect of
credit deepening on product per worker.
2 The basics of the Italian banking system
It is worth to briefly summon up the basic characteristics of the Italian
banking system in the period 1950-1970. The Italian credit structure was or-
ganized following the main criterion of functional partition among different
subjects involved in banking in order to associate the lending and borrowing
length. The banking law (issued in 1936) distinguished between institutes
providing short term or long term credit and among institutes involved in
different fields such as industry and services, agricultural and land. Focusing
on the industrial long term loans, the funds were supplied uniquely by the
Instituti di Credito Speciale per l’industria e le opere pubbliche (ICSs). At the
beginning of 1950s, together with the IMI Bank, the most important insti-
tution, other banks started to work in the long run credit industrial system:
the special branches of the Banchi Meridionali (Banco di Sicilia and Banco
di Napoli), the national institutions as Mediobanca, Centrobanca, Efibanca
Crediop, Icipu and the special section of Banca Nazionale del Lavoro. The
industrial credit system was accomplished between 1950 and 1953 by the im-
plementation of the ICSs with limited territorial jurisdiction as the Isveimer,
Irfis and Cis working in the South, and of the Mediocrediti Regionali acting
as investment banks at for Centre-North regions. The ICS collected savings
from various sources and lent then to industries on a long term horizon. As
it is largely known, the Italian banking system was essentially public domi-
nated. This characteristic arises from the ownership of the banks and from
the origin of the funds provided to the banking system for the lending activity.
The funds for the long run credit were provided by the bank bonds placed on
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the market, purchased by families and private or public institutions as well,
and by the transfers from the state treasury. A further element emphasizing
the role covered by the public sector in the lending activity is the favorable
credit transferred to industry. From 1950 onward the favorable credit in-
creased and the state was the first provider of resources. It acted by several
channels: shares on interest, securities, rotation funds, constitution funds
and bank bonds subscriptions. However the ownership of the banks, the ori-
gin of the funds and the increasing importance of subsidized credit, having
reference indirectly and directly to the State, suggest the strong dependence
of the industrial credit system on the public sector. The involvement of the
banking system in industrial financing increased along with increasing de-
centralization of credit institutions. The industrial policy assumed credit as
a measure and linked the realization of industrial plans to banking activity.
Both the reduction of territorial disparities and the organization of long run
banking on the base of regional perspective require a by area analysis at least
macro-regional. Moreover, according to the Italian policy makers’view the
development should run through the unbalanced path of growth in which
resources shift from agriculture to industry and the long run growth is deter-
mined by change in branches shares. All these elements together considered
address the analysis towards the territorial lending to industry branches.
3 The reconstruction of territorial lending to
industry by branch
The starting point for a reconstruction of long run loans to industry by
branch, missing in the official statistics, is the accounting identity of banks’
balances linking the stock of loans at time t, It, to the loans existing at time
t-1, It−1, ), to the loans issued at time t, Et, to the refunds (the due interests
are excluded) of the previous loans effectively paid back at time t, Rt. In
summary:
Itj = It−1j + Etj − Rtj (1)
where t=1960 to 1970 and j=jth branch of the manufacturing industry.The
definition of manufacturing industries considers the traditional branches with
the exclusion of buildings communications and transportations, and electric-
ity, gas and water production. The available data for Etj include long run
loans at the market rate and at the subsidized rate for the Mezzogiorno. In
such data collection, the definition of the Mezzogiorno embraces the eight
Italian regions of the South and a group of territories included in the “Inter-
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vento straordinario”. The first step is to split the amount of loans distributed
to these territories isolating the amount for the eight Italian regions of the
South in order to get a set of data comparable with other variables. An
employed method (Del Monte and Giannola 1997) uses the share of public
funding as capital expenditure of each region to compute the relative weight
then applied to obtain the amount of loans distributed to each region. How-
ever there are three reasons for not following this procedure. First, comparing
the amount of the public funding as capital expenditure and the distribution
of loans to industry as a whole broken down by regions, the former could
overestimate the weight of territories of Intervent Straordinario outside the
eight traditional regions of ’Historical Mezzogiorno’. Secondly, referring to
the latter set of data the value share of those territories varied greatly across
the market rate and subsidized loans. Finally, public funding as capital ex-
penditure was introduced in 1957 and started to work in 1958; so the data
cannot be related to any information before that date. The best available
distribution broken down by region and sector able to capture information
before 1960 comes from data about the granted not already distributed loans.
The partition distinguishes between the market rate and subsidized loans and
it relates to the overall period 1950-1966. A slight bias is appreciated when I
compare the partition to the regional loans for the whole period 1950-1960.
Anyway other statistical sources could produce much more bias as would be
the case with the granted not already distributed loans for the period 1950-
1964 since they do not discriminate between market rate and soft loans. The
second step is the computation of the effectively paid back refunds (the paid
interests are excluded) of the previous loans. This involves the amortization
schedule of loans. For the soft loans, the amortization time varied across the
incentivizing rules. In the period 1950-1960 I assume a ten year amortiza-
tion time for market rate and soft loans, since the rules providing a larger
amortization time did not work then. From 1960 to 1970 the amortization
time for subsidized loans is established at thirteen years. For the market rate
loans, over the entire considered period, a ten year amortization time will
be applied. A further consideration attains to the loans issued before 1954.
My data broken by branches are cumulative for the period 1950-1954. The
problem is how to partition the cumulated values by year. My choice is to
use the annual distribution of subsidized loans to the Southern industry for
the period 1950-1954 drawn from a data collection of the Svimez. Backcast-
ing throughout the annual growth rate and assuming the strong hypothesis
of not significant variation of the weights of each branch over 1950-1954, the
annual partition by branch for the eight southern regions is obtained. Unfor-
tunately values of loans estimated for 1950-1954 do not account for the loans
issued before 1950 and for the corresponding refunds. Assuming a ten year
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amortization time for the loans issued before 1950, their effect disappear on
bank balances between 1959 and 1960. In this respect, it is worth concluding
that the estimated values are representative of the loans’ stock of the south-
ern regions starting from 1960. The total sum of the estimated values are
reported in the Table 1 and compared to official values drawn from the Bank
of Italy (Bollettino, various issues).
Table 1: Estimated and official value of the loans distributed to the ’Historical
Mezzogiorno’ by the ICSs. Millions of current lire.
Years Estimated Official
1960 195236 265864
1961 269968 337268
1962 418054 511306
1963 600758 707642
1964 740379 997802
1965 840871 1154710
1966 1012694 1262200
1967 1145265 1576300
1968 1327898 1705669
1969 1585216 1908049
1970 1881990 2157566
Source: Bank of Italy for Official and my calculation for Estimated
The two time series are not obviously equal in absolute value since the
official series accounted for the loans under the ten year term. Since my goal is
to provide a feasible reconstruction of loans broken by regions and industrial
branches I just need to check the robustness of the aggregated series and
then to use the estimated branches’ weights to split the official values under
the main hypothesis that the loans below the ten year term follow the same
distribution of loans above the ten year term. The robustness of estimation
is checked by a non-parametric test of correlation between the estimated and
official values. The results (Table 2) of the tests indicate that estimated loans
in crude value and their annual growth rate are strongly correlated to the
official ones. The non parametric correlation test of Spearman also suggests
the non independece of the official and estimated series at 90%.
Finally the computed weight of each branch from my estimations are applied
to official values of the total loans obtaining the estimation by branches
for the Mezzogiorno and then, subtracting from the national data for each
branches, the correspondent partition for the Centre-North is obtained. The
results are reported in Tables 6 and 7 in the Appendix A.
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Table 2: Correlation tests
simple correlation Spearman’s Rho Prob> |t|
Spearman’s Rho
Absolute values 1.0000 0.0000
Annual percentage changes 0.77 0.6121 0.0600
4 The Italian industrialization strategy
During the 1960s public intervention turned out to be concerned about a
reduction in the territorial disparities, using, among other instruments, the
direct and indirect control over the ICSs. The loan flows increased in the
South and their stock relative to the overall mass of national industrial loans
came through the threshold of 40%, below which the resources might be not
efficient. The 40% threshold was recognized by several laws and by policy
makers as the minimum limit. The intention of raising the capital stock of the
southern manufacturing industry is clearer if the stock of loans is corrected
for the value added for each branch for which data are available. I construct
in table 3 an index of credit intensity defined as the ratio between the stock
of loans by branches and the correspondent value added. In all the branches
the index for the South is greater testifying the large transfer of resources
to southern manufacturing industries. In the Centre-North indexes were
below 0.5 in all the branches, except for the metallurgy industry, while in the
south indexes varied widely across sectors. The highest was for the textiles
and wearing industry but this was strongly influenced by its relative size
over the entire national textiles production and by its lower capital intensity
in the South. Here the typical textile firm had low capital intensity and
was characterized by low average productivity. In 1961 47.9% of all textile
productive units were in the South, but they counted for only 12.23% of the
total value added in the textiles. Furthermore, in the South the highest values
are associated with the usual capital intensive branches such as chemicals,
rubber and metallurgy.
There are several signs of a discretional and strategic criterion of pub-
lic power in the resources transferring process from the credit system to
branches of manufacturing industries. Many of these signs are drawn from
the reading of the industrial policy Acts. The Act of 1957 about the “In-
tervento straordinario”established that projects to be financed were eval-
uated by governmental technical advisories, the Ministry of Industry and
the Board of Ministries for the Mezzogiorno; the law of 1959 discriminated
firms depending on their size. More clearly the Act of 1965 reforming the
“Intervento straordinario”introduced an economic plan upon which the sub-
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Table 3: Credit Intensity Index (Average 1960-1970)
Branches Centre-North Mezzogiorno
Food and Beverage 0.149471 0.374086
Paper and printing 0.433046 3.236243
Chemicals 0.155449 2.607224
Mining and quarrying 0.44435 0.178715
Rubber 0.170862 1.982409
Woods 0.089922 0.190665
Mechanicals 0.181194 0.512609
Metallurgy 0.581492 2.678918
Non-metallous Minerals 0.103356 0.937383
Leather 0.178824 0.023096
Textiles and wearing 0.131618 5.608587
others 0.048700 1.211415
Source: See text
sidized loans were granted. The plan indicated the branches and the areas
to be subsidized. The favorite sectors were the basic industry (metallurgy
and chemicals industries) for its capacity to create scale economies and to
promote the growth of collateral branches, according to the scheme of un-
balanced growth (Hirschmann 1958). Many contributions at national level
suggest that from the second half of the 1960s basic industry (metallurgy and
chemicals) received much more attention throughout the country (i.e. Ranci
1983); other scholars include the food industry and mechanicals as strate-
gic sectors that were strongly subsidized (i.e. Pontolillo 1971). I develop a
comparative analysis of the distributed loans by branches and areas in order
to appreciate if different outlines were followed by public intervention. Us-
ing the non parametric test of Kolmogorov and Smirnov for the equality of
distribution, the attempt is to compare the distribution of the annual credit
intensity index (of each branch) for the Centre-North and the South (Table
4).
Before performing the test I manipulate the data through a standard-
ization of the annual observations. If the two distributions are statistically
similar I conclude that over the period the credit (and industrial) policy was
the same in the Centre-North and in the South. In reverse, if they are dif-
ferent two statuses are possible either the credit intensity was relatively low
in one area or the credit intensity was relatively high in the other. In order
to solve this problem I simply look at the regional share over the national
credit by branches. I discuss the results of the test for broad categories.
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Table 4: Kolmogorov-Smirnov test on the distribution of credit intensity
index
D Statistics P-value P-value corrected
Food and Beverage 0.2727 0.808 0.719
Paper and printing 0.6364* 0.023 0.011
Chemicals 0.5455* 0.076 0.042
Quarrying and mining 0.3636 0.461 0.349
Rubber 0.5455* 0.076 0.042
Mechanicals 0.3636 0.461 0.349
Leather 0.5455* 0.076 0.042
Metallurgy 0.5455* 0.076 0.042
Woods 0.2727 0.808 0.719
Non metallic minerals 0.5455* 0.076 0.042
Textiles and wearing 0.5455* 0.076 0.042
* Significant at 5%
Progressive sectors. The ’fly wheels’ of Italian manufacturing industry
over the 1955-1970 were the chemical and mechanical industries. They were
the progressive branches, in the sense that they pushed the Italian economic
system towards the long run path of industrialization. From a technolog-
ical perspective these two branches are not always progressive. Unfortu-
nately, the available data on credit loans are collected for broad categories
of productions. So in the mechanical industry, the more progressive and
less progressive sub-branches are collected together. Several sub-branches of
the mechanical industry are science based, highly involved in technological
progress, others are scale intensive sector (such as the Motor Vehicle indus-
try) with vertically integrated firms, others are specialized suppliers in which
innovation is derived from the upstream industry. In the chemical industry
the story is not different. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test shows that the me-
chanical industry in each area benefited from a quite similar credit deepening.
This lead to argue that industrial policy do not altered the location of such
industry which remained a strong point for the Centre-North manufacturing
industry. In fact, its relevance was higher in the North as is shown by the
share of the loans over the total credit in this area. On the contrary, different
distributions are appreciated in the chemical industry. The credit strength
is higher in the Mezzogiorno where more than one third of the stock of loans
is yearly attributed to the chemical industry.
Metallurgy industry. Special attention was given to the financing of the
primary metal industries. Such branches assumed great importance in both
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areas but the distribution of loans is gathered for the Mezzogiorno in the
second half of the 1960s and in the Centre-North in the first half, almost
as if the implementation of the industry was realized in a two step strategy.
Indeed, the test shows different industrial policy followed by the government,
mainly due to the different timing.
Traditional sectors.Among the traditional sectors I focus on food, bever-
age, and tobacco, and on textiles (including wearing). In the former branch
the distribution of the loans relative to value added is the same in both areas
but I observe a kind of redistribution of the funding between the two areas.
In the second branches there are several above-mentioned differences. At the
beginning of the 1960s the textiles industry (including wearing) was gath-
ered in the Centre-North and relatively missing in the South. The different
distribution over time reveals the purpose of strengthening these branches in
the North, as it is drawn from the time trend of the share of loans.
The summary analysis by branches and areas depicts an industrialization
model coherent to the constraints imposed by the stage of development of
Italy at the beginning of the “economic miracle”. The implementation of
the metallurgy and chemicals industries looked to be compulsory in order to
fully industrialize Italy. As a consequence, the Italian industry was devoted
to a model of innovation based on the adaptive imitation and the passive
adoption of olden technologies rather than on the production of novel tech-
nologies. This fits in the late comer status of the Italian economy. The last
argument and the statistical evidence on the loans distributed suggest that
the industrialization governed by public power was strategically oriented to
a by sector approach. The pillars were the metallurgy industry in both ar-
eas (though realization timing was different) and the progressive sectors, the
chemical and mechanical industry. Chemical industry was gathered in the
South whilst the mechanical industry remained a strong point of the Centre-
North. Anyway, the annual stock of loans and the credit intensity index show
a great effort to implement the mechanicals also in the Mezzogiorno, but the
attempt was confined essentially to the motor vehicle industry. From the pre-
vious discussion, it arises that Italian policy makers, by means of control over
industrial credit, tended to realize a model of industrialization diversified by
branches and areas. The credit intensity and the strategy of industrializa-
tion support the interpretation advanced by economic historiography which
stressed the financial based development of the Italian economy during the
golden age (i.e. Nardozzi 2004).
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5 A quantitative analysis of the Italian indus-
trial policy
The non parametric analysis of the previous sections outlined the qualitative
aspects of the Italian industrial policy of the 1960s from which a well suited
strategy related to sectors and areas arose. However, the qualitative analysis
provides us with just a limited view of the impact of industrial policy. For this
reason in this section I try to implement a quantitative analysis of the long
run loans to manufacturing industries in the considered period. The impact
of credit, largely controlled by policy makers, is evaluated with regard to
eleven industrial sectors in the two broad areas of Italy, the Centre-North
and the Mezzogiorno over the period 1960-1970. The most widely accepted
models to capture the size and magnitude of the credit effect on productivity
or on other growth indicators are based on the pooled cross-section approach
taking account of a convergence parameter. These models are estimated, for
example, in the pioneer work of King and Levine (1993) for a large group
of countries over the period 1960-1988. Alternatively the empirical research
of Rajan and Zingales (1998) focused on cross section data for American
industries exploring channels through which finance in a broad sense affects
the size and profit rate of firms. The model estimated in my work actually
uses all available informations across space and time and so forth it belongs
to the class of Cross-Section Time Series models.
The main theoretical underpinning is based on the effect of credit (CREDIT)
over the average product per worker. The extensive investments in the 1950s
and the 1960 are devoted to enlarging the disposable equipment for the scale-
intensive production and to the acquisition of knowledge (technologies) from
abroad.The transmission channel is via the capital labor ratio enhanced by
credit deepening. The more the long run credit, the higher the capital labor
ratio, the larger the average product per worker is. In this respect, the impact
of loans is almost direct on the capital labor ratio and on the average prod-
uct. What is uncertain is the time passing between the distributed loans and
the effective results on the average product. For this reason I can consider
that the credit affects currently and with one lag average product per worker
(respectively variables CREDIT and Lagged CREDIT in the models). More-
over other variables are inserted as control variables in the estimation. First,
I have considered the role of foreign trade by means of two variables, the
sector terms of trade (TOT) and the nominal effective exchange rate (NER).
The Sector terms of trade, defined as the ratio between the export and im-
port price index, capture sectors competitiveness on foreign markets based
on qualitative elements such as market power or technological advantages
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Table 5: Cross-sectional time series FGLS regressions
Dependent variable: growth rates of value added per worker
Model I Model II Model III Model IV
-0.0050 0.0018 -0.0002 0.0055
Credit
(0.0170) (0.0172) (0.0167) (0.01676)
0.0455∗∗∗ 0.0504∗∗∗ 0.0488∗∗∗ 0.0552∗∗∗
Lagged Credit
(0.0171) (0.0173) (0.0169) (0.0171)
−0.0432∗ −0.0481∗
Nominal wages
(0.0239) (0.0246)
−0.0332 −0.0408
Lagged Nominal wages
(0.0271) (0.0281)
0.0069∗∗ 0.0072∗∗ 0.0055∗ 0.0059∗
REGIO
(0.0031) (0.0032) (0.0033) (0.0034)
0.4014∗∗ 0.3379∗ 0.5365∗∗∗ 0.4792∗∗∗
NER
(0.1714) (0.1790) (0.1608) (0.1686)
0.00001∗∗∗ 0.00001∗∗∗
Terms of trade
(0.000003) (3.42E-06)
-0.0099 0.0135
Real wages
(0.02575) (0.0281)
0.0081 0.0034
Lagged real wages
(0.0335) (0.0347)
0.0285∗∗∗ 0.0294∗∗∗ 0.0210∗∗∗ 0.0213∗∗∗
C
(0.0044) (0.0046) (0.0036) (0.0037)
Standard error in parentheses. Panel heteroskedastic and panel specific AR(1) correlation. Obs: 198, groups: 22, time period 9 (1961-1970)
∗∗∗ significant at 1%, ∗∗ at 5%, ∗ at 10%
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while the nominal effective exchange rate captures the pure price compet-
itiveness. Secondly, I introduce the sectoral nominal and real wages. In a
pure competitive economy the marginal labor productivity and real wages
move together in the same direction and the causal relationship is from the
former towards the latter. Many circumstances could lead to a disease of
this mechanism. The prevalence of imperfect competition or of monopoly
rules out the direct relation between productivity and real wages. Moreover,
well organized labor unions and industrial associations could prevent that
real wages are fixed according to productivity. Furthermore, there is a lot
of evidence that unions are concerned about nominal wage rather than real
wage in the bargaining. On the other hand, nominal wages are naturally
perceived from industrials as a cost. This is what economic theory predicts.
However, historical context is binding to determine the actual relationship
between labor and capital. In several epochs and regions, the bargaining is
about nominal wages. In the context of Italian economic history during the
golden age, the tacit agreement between labor and capital prioritized capital
accumulation in order to promote future growth. In this respect, nominal
wage is a variable exogenously fixed at consistent level to foster investments.
Therefore, the model specification includes real and nominal wages in prin-
ciple to take account of the possible effect on productivity under the reliable
hypothesis that nominal wages were exogenously determined. Thirdly, I con-
sider whether the sectors are located in the southern regions or not. For this
purpose I used a dummy variable (1 if the sector is located in the south,
0 otherwise). The proper model for policy analysis is a cross section time
series (CSTS) commonly used in the social science literature. Before the
results of the estimated model are presented, attention is given to the model
specification. The pooled OLS estimators for a CSTS model are likely to
be unbiased, inefficient or inconsistent for several problems related to serial
correlations of residuals, heteroskedasticity, contemporaneous correlation or
causal heterogeneity across section and time. A more correct specification is
addressed by the fact that pooled OLS produces residuals that suffer from
many of the problems outlined above. Most recently the SUR regression
has received great attention as it is able to overcome those problems provid-
ing at the same time cross specific coefficients for the explanatory variables.
Notwithstanding, it is not possible to estimate the model if cross section
elements are larger than observed periods as in this case. So I run differ-
ent models that take account of the most relevant matters as well. Table
5 presents various versions of feasible GLS estimation of contemporaneous
correlation considering both autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity of error
terms, and moreover the correlation is supposed to be panel specific in the
form of autoregressive process of order one. The specification of the models
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involves all the variables in year percentage variations. The results of all the
models of Table 5 are robust to different hypothesis about the methods to
compute autocorrelation. All the versions suggest a positive and significant
effect of credit percentage variation at lag one on the percentage variation
of average product per worker. Though the contemporaneous association
of the two variables is not significant, the lagged effect of credit is verified.
This means that the positive change of distributed loans affects the capital
labor ratio with some retard since at least one year is needed to new capital
influencing average product. It is due to the time required to actually real-
ize investments or to adjust human capital. This outcome is also plausible
in front of the nature of the data I used. The long run loans are actually
suspected to be likely productive investments either enhancing the quantity
and quality of capital readily inserted into production. In this phase gains
in product per worker are possible together with a reduction in the unem-
ployment rate in all areas of the country. I did not prove the direct effect
of credit on employment or unemployment levels, but one could argue that
since branches of the manufacturing industry absorbed a large part of labor
excess even in the presence of increasing product per worker, the industrial
policy achieved the targets of the government. The REGIO dummy variable
is significant and positive in all the models. It captures the fact that branches
working in the southern regions have experimented a higher growth rate of
product per worker. The outcome is consistent with the decreasing marginal
returns of production factors. However, I tend to give more importance to
the advantages of backwardness especially for what attains to the incorpora-
tion of more recent technologies and organizational systems. The hypothesis
of decreasing returns in factor productivity does not hold in the phase of
extensive growth (Eichengreen and Vazquez, 1999) but the emulation of best
practice allow to achieve more gains in productivity, the larger the distance
from the frontier is. Moreover, I stress what is likely to have influenced av-
erage product over this period and what did not. One of the most leading
explanations of Italian growth is the export based view (Kindleberger and
Graziani) captured in my models by both sector terms of trade and nom-
inal effective exchange rate. They respectively describe two different ways
of competition in foreign markets. The pure price competition, interpreted
by NER is positive and statistically significant in all the specifications. The
technological and organizational competitiveness explained by sector terms
of trade is significant but the coefficient is however small. Real wages and
average product per worker are not linked, as expected, throughout any rela-
tion. On the contrary, the elasticity of average product to change in nominal
wage verifies the working of the tacit agreement between labor and capital in
the industrial relationship in Italy. Since the production factors cooperated
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to realize the target of boosting industrialization, nominal wages were settled
at the lowest level consistent with intensive capital accumulation. As com-
pensation, industrials overinvested to absorb unemployment. The negative
coefficient of nominal wage captures the possible causal relation from the
reduction of wages, to the realization of high profit, to higher investments
and finally a higher growth rate of average product per worker. Identifying
the future outcomes of this agreement is not the aim of this paper; the key
point is that nominal wages are to be inserted in the model specification to
control for this variable as well in determining direct linkage from credit to
growth of product per worker. A fact that was not unusual in postwar Eu-
rope, as maintained by Eichengreen and Vazquez (1999): “Wage moderation
stimulated investment by enhancing its profitability and making available
the resources to finance it“.
Concluding remarks
The most relevant outcomes from previous sections support the view of Ital-
ian development over the 1960s driven and influenced by credit deepening.
The direct or indirect public control of credit market allowed for a strat-
egy of development centered on industrial credit as a primary policy in that
period. Public power addressed the configuration of the Italian industrial
structure, influencing the realization of metallurgy and chemical industry in
the South and of metallurgy and mechanical industry in the Centre-North.
Moreover, the quantitative analysis of section four clarifies the overall influ-
ence of credit deepening on product per worker in eleven branches of the
manufacturing industries in the two Italian macro-regions showing a posi-
tive and robust correlation between growth and long run loans in the 1960s.
Such analysis could be useful to interpret the change in the Italian economy
of subsequent decades. The effects of the Italian strategy of industrialization
are crucial to understanding both the quality of territorial development and
the subsequent slowdown of the 1970s. The initial gathering of chemicals
and metallurgy industry in the South rose both productivity and employ-
ment. The by-product of that strategy was a concentration of monopolistic
and oligopolistic markets in the South 1. In the Centre-North the financing
of the mechanical industry, altogheter with the metallurgy industry, led to a
more diversified and balanced industrial structure, mixing firms devoted to
absorbing the excess of labor and firms engaged in tech intensive production.
In this area the contestability degree was higher in many branches either in
1It has been shown that the leading sectors were dominated by few industries, as
mintained by Giannetti and Vasta 2004
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the textiles or in some sub-branches of light mechanicals, though large sectors
were strongly affected by monopolistic positions as well (rubber, transport
equipment or motor vehicle). A further by-product of the Italian strategy
of industrialization is the polarization of southern development around the
big state-owned or private companies while the SMEs system relied on a
marginal position. In the Centre-North the landscape is different: the big
firms and the small and medium firms, widely diffused or gathered in the
districts, independent from or integrated to the cycle of big firms, cohabit.
The organizational and productive structure suited by the industrialization
strategy showed its weakness from the end of the 1960s. The change in la-
bor, raw materials and energy goods prices are differently absorbed by the
two areas since the outcomes of industrial policy of 1960s were different. Be-
cause of the rigidity of the big firms, the southern economy failed to react to
change in the relative prices, and thanks to the flexibility of SMEs system,
the Centre-North seemed to better fit the new macroeconomic environment.
When at the end of the 1960s the common market was completed, the Ital-
ian economy is almost fully integrated into Europe and when at the start of
the 1970s the Bretton Woods system disappeared, SMEs system was ready
to exploit the new phase of the Italian industrial policy based on competi-
tive devaluation. As has been shown in the models outlined in section four
the average product per worker was yet strongly influenced by change in
nominal effective exchange rate. The slump of Bretton Woods facilitate the
use of competitive devaluation which benefited the firms of Centre-North,
because of their organization and production composition, widening the dis-
tance from the South in terms of productivity. This represents a substitution
of policy perspective shifting from the activism of the 1960s (planning in the
broad sense) to intervention based on pure price competitiveness to finally
reaching a free market trust in the 1980s. This interpretation is consistent
with Desmet’ suggestion (2002) of a harmful change, from investment incen-
tives to income support in public policy during the 1970s, quite similar to
Boltho et alt.’s argument (1997). Along this path the Italian economy lost
its propulsive capacity but the South suffered more for the transformation of
its economic structure, which started in the 1950s, boosted in the 1960s and
suddenly interrupted at the beginning of the 1970s.
17
References
[1] Bank of Italy, Bollettino, various issues, Rome
[2] Boltho A. (1989), Did policy actism work?, European Economic Review,
Vol 33 (9), pp. 1709-1726.
[3] Boltho A., Carlin W., Scaramozzino P., (1997). Will East Germany
become a new Mezzogiorno?, Journal of Comparative Economics, vol.
24, pp. 241-64.
[4] Cameron R. (ed.) (1972), Banking and Economic Development, Some
Lessons of History, New York.
[5] Chenery. H. B., (1962), Development Policies for Southern Italy, The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 76 (4), pp. 515-547.
[6] Cohen J. S. (1967), Financing Industrialization in Italy, 1894-1914: The
Partial Transformation of a Late-Comer, Journal of Economic History,
vol. 27(3), pp. 363-382.
[7] Consiglio Nazionale dell’economia e del Lavoro (1980), Rapporto CNEL
sull’economia del Mezzogiorno. Indagini settoriali e compendio statis-
tico, Rome.
[8] Crafts N. F. R., Toniolo G., (1996), Economic Growth in Europe since
1945, Cambridge.
[9] Del Monte A., Giannola A., (1997), Istituzioni economiche e Mezzo-
giorno: analisi delle politiche di sviluppo, Roma.
[10] Desmet K., (2002), A Simple Dynamic Model of Uneven Development
and Overtaking, The Economic Journal, Vol. 112 (482), pp. 894-918.
[11] B. Eichengreen (2007), The European Economy Since 1945: Coordinated
Capitalism and Beyond, Princeton-Oxford.
[12] B. Eichengreen, P. Vazquez (2000), Institutions and Economic Growth
in Postwar Europe: Evidence and Conjectures, in B. van Ark, S. K.
Kuipers, G.H. Kuper Productivity, technology and economic growth.
18
[13] G. Federico, R. Giannetti (1999), Le politiche industriali, in F. Amatori,
D. Bigazzi, R. Giannetti, L. Segreto, Storia d’Italia, Vol. 15, l’Industria,
Torino.
[14] G. Federico, J. Foreman-Peck (1999), European Industrial Policy, The
Twentieth-Century Experience, New York
[15] A. Gerschenkron (1955), Notes on the Rate of Industrial Growth in Italy,
1881-1913, The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 15 (4).
[16] A. Gerschenkron (1962), Economic backwardness in historical perspec-
tive: a book of essays, Harward.
[17] R. Giannetti (2004), La dinamica delle industrie manifatturiere italiane
(1908-1971), in R. Giannetti, M. Vasta (eds.), Evolution of Italian En-
terprises in the 20. century, Physica-Verlag, 2006.
[18] M. Gomellini (2004), ’Il commercio estero dell’Italia negli anni sessanta:
specializzazione internazionale e tecnologia’, Bank of Italy, Quaderni
dell’Ufficio Ricerche Storiche, Numero 7 - Giugno.
[19] M. Gomellini, M. Pianta (2007), Commercio con l’estero e tecnologia
in Italia negli anni Cinquanta e Sessanta, in C. Antonelli, F. Barbi-
ellini Amidei, R. Giannetti, M. Gomellini, S. Pastorelli, M. Pianta,
Innovazione tecnologica e sviluppo industriale nel secondo dopoguerra,
Ricerche per la storia della Banca d’Italia - Vol. X, Roma.
[20] A. Graziani (1979), L’efficacia degli incentivi, in F. Marzano (a cura
di),Incentivi e sviluppo del Mezzogiorno, Milano.
[21] A. Graziani (1998), Lo sviluppo dell’economia italiana, dalla ri-
costruzione alla moneta europea, Torino.
[22] G. M. Gros-Pietro (1986), Investimenti, crescita e cambiamento del sis-
tema industriale italiano, in Istituto Mobiliare Italiano,Misure e modalit
di trent’anni di sviluppo in Italia, Roma.
[23] Hirschmann, A. O., (1958), The Strategy of Economic Development,
Yale.
19
[24] C. P. Kindleberger,
[25] R. King, R. Levine (1993), Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might be
Right, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 108 (3), pp. 717-737.
[26] Ministro per gli interventi straordinari nel Mezzogiorno e nelle zone de-
presse del Centro-Nord (1967), Relazione sull’attuazione del piano di
coordinamento degli interventi pubblici nel Mezzogiorno, Roma.
[27] Ministro per gli interventi straordinari nel Mezzogiorno e nelle zone de-
presse del Centro-Nord (various issues), Relazione sull’attuazione del
piano di coordinamento degli interventi pubblici nel Mezzogiorno e sui
provvedimenti delle aree depresse del Centro-Nord, Roma.
[28] G. Nardozzi (1983), Tre sistemi creditizi a confronto, Bologna.
[29] G. Nardozzi (2004), The Italian “economic miracle ”, Rivista di Storia
Economica, Vol. XIX (2), p.139-180.
[30] K. Pavitt (1984), Sectoral Patterns of Technical Change: Towards a
Taxonomy and a Theory, Research Policy, Vol. 13 (6).
[31] S. Pergolesi (1988), Il credito agevolato alle imprese industriali, Milano.
[32] G. Piluso (1999), Gli istituti di credito speciale, in F. Amatori, D.
Bigazzi, R. Giannetti, L. Segreto, Storia d’Italia. Vol. 15, l’Industria,
Torino.
[33] V. Pontolillo (1971), Aspetti del sistema del credito speciale con partico-
lare riferimento al ruolo dello stato, in Bank of Italy, Bollettino, Roma.
[34] V. Pontolillo (1980), Il sistema di credito speciale in Italia, Bologna.
[35] Rajan, R., Zingales, L., (1998), Financial Dependence and Growth, The
American Economic Review, Vol. 88 (3), pp. 559-586.
[36] P. Ranci (1983) (ed), I trasferimenti dello Stato alle imprese industriali
negli anni settanta, Bologna.
20
[37] P. Savona (1979), La struttura industriale italiana: analisi dei problemi
e delle prospettive, Economia italiana, Vol. 1, pp. 43-66.
[38] P. Silvestri (1983), Agevolazioni sul credito e contributi in conto capitale,
in P. Ranci (a cura di), I trasferimenti dello Stato alle imprese industriali
negli anni settanta, Bologna.
[39] Spadavecchia A (2007)., Regional and National Industrial Policies in
Italy, 1950s-1993. Where Did the Subsidies Flow?, Economics and man-
agement discussion paper, University of Reading.
[40] Svimez (1956), Notizie sull’economia del Mezzogiorno, Roma.
21
Appendix A Data and sources
Territorial values added is current values and workers engaged by industrial
branches are from the old time series provided by the Istituto centrale di
statistica published in the Consiglio Nazionale dell’economia e del Lavoro
(1980). Current values are converted in the real values using the implicit de-
flators of value added by sectors for Italy as a whole reported in the Annuario
di contabilit nazionale edited by the Istituto Centrale di Statistica (1980).
National data for the long run loans by branches and territorial data for long
run loans to manufacturing industry as a whole, come from Banca d’Italia,
Bollettino, various issues. Nominal effective exchange rate is from the Inter-
national Monetary System Statistics. Nominal wages by sectors and areas
are minimum contractual wage for workers of second class. There were six
classes of workers according to their skills. The main source is the Annuario
di Statistiche del lavoro e dell’emigrazione published by the Istituto centrale
di statistica for the period 1960-1967. From 1968 to 1970 the source is an-
other Istituto centrale di statistica publication, the Annuario di statistiche
industriali. The territorial price indexes used to build real wages come from
the Annuario di Statistiche del lavoro e dell’emigrazione (1960-1971). Sector
terms of trade are constructed as the ratio between the index number of ex-
ported goods and the index number of imported goods of the same category.
The statistical source is the Statistica annuale del commercio con l’estero,
published by Istituto centrale di statistica for the years 1960-1970. The main
source to collect data on the long run loans to the manufacturing industry
in the territories of the “Intervento straordinario”is the annual report to the
parliament of the Board of Ministries for the Mezzogiorno and depressed ar-
eas of the Centre-North. In the report of 1967, the 1950-1954 cumulated
loans and annual loans over 1955-1960 by branches to the territories of the
“Intervento Straordinario”are collected. For the period 1961-1970 I used the
same source (however the title changes slightly) presented to Parliament in
the year 1969, 1970 and 1971. The annual growth rate of subsidized loans to
southern regions used to split cumulated data for 1950-1954 are from Svimez
(1956), Notizie sull’economia del Mezzogiorno.
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Table 6: Loans by branches to the Mezzogiorno (market rate and subsidized loans). Millions of current Lire.
Branches 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
mining and quarrying 11041 9809 9484 9065 10699 12138 11397 21695 20898 21483 32644
food and beverage 45335 55911 66012 81430 101466 115862 118640 131233 150961 152153 153825
wood 5887 6514 8239 14123 19181 19655 22448 28520 28801 28859 30014
non metallic minerals 30190 34241 55135 80366 124114 143486 132046 145659 144898 142300 158801
metallurgy 32398 28600 49683 97038 173133 187771 195773 261282 265367 312184 340588
mechanicals 26291 38355 57063 76993 109733 127809 133428 159528 158278 193958 255127
chemicals 74059 111933 184066 243109 308203 381679 433983 580521 688933 805640 914400
rubber 1177 1821 3382 5360 13048 13152 13430 18241 17543 15094 15525
paper 9425 14838 34623 42336 58356 60242 76153 90690 82757 82732 75061
leather 1868 1655 2296 3573 4696 4726 4471 5345 5033 6658 6688
textile and wearing 20127 22708 24117 29792 40740 52941 58449 65631 67489 75497 83682
others 8066 10883 17207 24458 34433 35248 61982 67956 74712 71491 91211
Total 265864 337268 511306 707642 997802 1154710 1262200 1576301 1705669 1908049 2157566
Source: see text
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Table 7: Loans by branches to the Centre-North (market rate and subsidized loans). Millions of current Lire.
Branches 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
mining and quarrying 55841 62030 61546 74534 77616 75791 79291 82743 92181 94249 76433
food and beverage 23618 42851 58108 73435 81014 85209 124167 179348 210742 235591 194554
wood 7824 13562 21149 24746 27798 31022 39526 42672 63551 86128 88323
non metalllic minerals 14998 23764 22503 21953 15606 21295 40656 80688 99838 123387 113444
metallurgy 6038 156599 177541 201335 297724 312128 391181 419010 469433 420485 503871
chemicals 205029 251294 332952 399397 430524 469630 505425 545900 671949 860266 1054254
mechanicals 94963 116079 125431 163070 120003 109539 99642 128755 186436 257361 300700
rubber 1756 3712 5860 12338 32942 37209 40430 28796 34940 52739 57056
paper 18760 20822 27003 55391 80868 99398 104814 110936 147893 143143 147495
leather 1894 5078 7031 7448 12191 13494 11960 19144 26455 28785 28984
textiles and wearing 45079 75018 112312 134370 134161 138135 176215 237694 274977 324035 324908
others 9004 12345 26299 37641 17754 26182 3727 11095 18170 32759 31772
total 614804 783154 977736 1205659 1328201 1419031 1617034 1886781 2296566 2658928 2921794
Source: see text
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